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Regulating Robo Advisors: Old Policy Goals, New Challenges
Summary
Financial “robo advice”—an automated service that ranks or matches consumers to financial products—has
gained significant attention in the investment industry and on the Hill, but there has not yet been a consensus
on how to regulate these new services. Robo advisors often are on par with and can exceed the standards of
human advices, but they don’t fit into the category of fiduciary, and therefore won’t be held to the same
regulatory standard that humans advisors are. Nonetheless, they are subject to systemic risks and the potential
for abuses that can hurt consumers. Professors Tom Baker and Benedict Dellaert offer a regulatory trajectory
to follow as the technology of robo advisors continues to develop and expand.
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Regulating Robo Advisors: Old 
Policy Goals, New Challenges
Tom Baker, JD and Benedict Dellaert, PhD
In the popular press, a “robo advisor” is an automated investment service that 
competes with human financial advisors by claiming to offer better advice and 
service and, therefore, better investment returns, at a lower price.1
We use the term robo advisor more broadly to refer to 
any automated service that ranks, or matches con-
sumers to, financial products on a personalized basis, 
sometimes in addition to providing related services 
such as educating consumers and selling products 
to them. The investment-focused robo advisors have 
drawn the most attention from regulators,2 but the 
promises and regulatory concerns raised by investment 
robo advisors also apply to their insurance and bank-
ing counterparts.3 
Because of the scale that automation makes pos-
sible, robo advisors have the potential to provide qual-
ity advice to more people at lower costs than humans, 
and to do so with greater transparency.4 Yet the fact 
that this potential exists hardly guarantees that it will 
be realized. People design, model, program, implement, 
and market robo advisors, and many robo advisors 
operate behind the scenes, as they have done for many 
years, assisting people who interact with clients and 
customers. And the history of people taking advantage 
of consumers in the financial services industry is not a 
pretty one.5 
Even setting fraud and other unsavory activities 
to the side, the riches to be won by those who succeed 
in “disrupting” the financial services industry provide 
SUMMARY
• Because of the scale that automation makes possible, “robo 
advisors” have the potential to provide quality advice on financial 
investments to more people at lower costs than humans can, 
and to do so with greater transparency. However, the systemic 
risks and potential for abuses are significant too.
• While regulators of course need to be vigilant, it also is impor-
tant they not over-react to the deployment of robo advisors. 
For now, the standard against which robo advisors should be 
compared is that of humans, who are far from perfect.
• This issue brief lays out four core technical components of 
robo advisors that regulators need to understand and to de-
velop procedures to assess. Because there is so little research 
available to guide the regulation of robo advisors today, and 
because the need for regulatory oversight will only escalate 
as the sophistication and scale of robo advice increases, the 
brief offers regulators a regulatory trajectory to follow.
• Robo advising could give rise to a fundamental shift in financial 
regulatory strategy: from regulating the content of consumer 
financial products to (a) facilitating access to the data that 
robo advisors need and (b) taking appropriate measures to 
verify the quality of the robo advisors and public accessibility 
to them.
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more than enough incentive to rush 
technology to market. In addition, 
there are concerns that automation 
may entrench historical unfairness6 
and promote a financial services 
monoculture with new kinds of unfair-
ness and a greater vulnerability to 
catastrophic failure than the less coor-
dinated actions of humans working 
without automated advice.7 Thus, robo 
advisors pose significant challenges 
for regulators seeking to preserve the 
integrity of financial markets. 
At the same time, however, it is 
important not to over-react by setting 
a higher bar for robo advisors than for 
human advisors. For now, the standard 
against which robo advisors should 
be compared is that of humans, who 
are far from perfect. Although it may 
be appropriate to hold robo advisors 
to a super-human standard someday, 
their share of the roughly $25 trillion 
U.S. personal investment market8 is 
too small (see Figure 1), and regula-
tors have too much to learn, to do so 
today. Yet financial services regulators 
do have substantial legal authority, 
well-developed economic and his-
torical justifications to guide their 
actions, and a diversity of regulatory 
tools to employ right now. It is time to 
assess how they should respond to the 
automation of robo advisors, espe-
cially when that automation extends 
to helping consumers decide which 
products to buy.
In this Issue Brief, we lay out 
the traditional goals that financial 
services regulation promotes: compe-
tence, honesty, and suitability.9 Any 
well-designed robo advisor should 
meet those goals at least as well as 
(and most likely better than) a typical 
human advisor, with a strong emphasis 
placed on the caveat, “well-designed.” 
We then identify four core techni-
cal components of robo advisors that 
regulators need first to understand and 
then to develop procedures to assess. 
Our objective is to sketch the early 
stages of a regulatory trajectory that 
regulators can follow as robo advisors 
develop in sophistication and scale. 
JUSTIFYING ROBO 
REGULATION 
The aspects of financial services 
regulation most likely to apply to 
new robo advisors are those directed 
at current consumer product inter-
mediaries. Intermediaries like securi-
ties brokers, mortgage brokers, and 
insurance agents and brokers have 
 1  See, e.g., Rob Berger, “7 Robo Advisors That Make Invest-
ing Effortless,” Forbes, February 5, 2015; Arielle O’Shea, 
“Best Robo-Advisors: 2017 Top Picks,” NerdWallet, June 
23, 2017.
 2  FINRA (March 2016), Report on Digital Investment Advice, 
available at: http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-
investment-advice-report.pdf. 
 3  Insurance robo advisors include Healthcare.gov (health 
insurance) and Coverhound.com (auto and homeowners 
insurance). We have not found any true robo advisors in the 
banking context, but Zillow’s mortgage tools and NerdWal-
let’s credit card tools are a step in that direction.
 4  Abhijeet Sinha (2016), “Increasing the Efficiency and Effec-
tiveness of Financial Advice with Robo-Advisors,” Infosys. 
 5 See, e.g., Neil Fligstein & Alexander F. Roehrkasse (2016), 
“The Causes of Fraud in the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 
2009: Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Industry,” 81 AM SOC. REV. 617; Michael Corkery, “Wells 
Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Ac-
counts,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 2016.
 6  See, e.g., Kate Crawford, “Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy 
Problem,” New York Times, June 25, 2016.
 7  See, e.g., Cathy O’Neil (2016), Weapons of Math Destruc-
tion: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens 
Democracy. See also, Dario Amodei et al., “Concrete Prob-
lems in AI Safety,” arXiv.org: 1606.06565, July 25, 2016. 
For an effort by the tech industry to address some of these 
challenges, see www.partnershiponai.org.
 8  Investment Company Institute (2015), Investment Company 
Fact Book, available at: https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_fact-
book.pdf.
 9  Note that this description of the three goals is a conceptual 
one that does not map perfectly on the diversity of financial 
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the potential to help consumers make 
better sense of the financial services 
available to them and, accordingly, to 
ameliorate the information imbalance 
between consumers and the produc-
ers of financial products. But there 
are significant challenges to reaching 
this potential. Consumers are almost 
as poorly equipped to identify the 
quality of an intermediary as they are 
to evaluate the quality of the financial 
products. For example, because they 
need the help of the intermediary 
to evaluate those products, consum-
ers cannot evaluate the quality of the 
intermediary by evaluating the quality 
of the intermediary’s recommenda-
tions. Moreover, the prevailing com-
mission-based compensation regime 
for intermediaries creates significant 
conflicts of interests that lead to biased 
advice.10 The justification for regulat-
ing robo advisors, therefore, is rooted 
in the broad U.S. policy priority of 
protecting consumers from being taken 
advantage of due to their relative lack 
of knowledge about financial products.
ESTABLISHED OBJECTIVES: 
COMPETENCE, HONESTY, 
AND SUITABILITY 
At least for mass-market consumer 
financial products, a well-designed 
robo advisor should outperform most 
humans in matching consumers to 
financial products, while being as hon-
est as the most honest humans. 
For a robo advisor, the assessment 
of competence and suitability go hand 
in hand. By definition, a competent 
robo advisor will only recommend 
suitable products. Indeed, using dif-
ficult test cases to evaluate whether a 
robo advisor consistently recommends 
suitable products is one of the ways 
to evaluate whether the robo advisor 
is well-designed. Humans are differ-
ent: even competent humans make 
mistakes, and even competent humans 
can be biased or dishonest.11 It is for 
this reason that financial services reg-
ulators developed suitability and other 
conduct standards that permit an 
after-the-fact assessment of whether 
intermediaries gave good advice.12 
In terms of honesty, there are 
different potential standards. At a 
minimum, honesty means making 
only true statements about the prod-
ucts, the advisor’s compensation, and 
anything else that is relevant to the 
products, the advice, and the purchase 
process. Honesty also should include 
accurately describing the basis for 
any recommendations, making any 
commonsense disclosures that might 
be needed to correct a misimpression 
that the advisor is considering all of 
the products in the market if the advi-
sor is not doing so, disclosing the exis-
tence of any compensation or other 
arrangements that might have the 
potential to bias the advice in a way 
that is not consistent with consumer’s 
interests, and providing advice that is 
not biased in that manner. 
A robo advisor will always provide 
the advice that it is programmed to 
provide, and it can be programmed 
in a way that meets a demanding 
standard of honesty: making only true 
statements, disclosing the methods for 
providing the advice, and providing 
advice that considers only factors that 
are consistent with the consumer’s 
interests (insofar as it is possible to 
know those interests). This more 
demanding honesty standard should 
be one important aspect of what it 
means to be well-designed. 
As existing investments robo advi-
sors demonstrate, the product match-
ing function can easily be automated 
for investors who are prepared to 
adopt the passive investing strategy 
recommended by disinterested finance 
researchers, as can some other aspects 
of investing, such as rebalancing.13 
Relationship management and other, 
more difficult to model aspects of the 
work of financial advisors are harder 
services regulations. Cf. Howell E. Jackson, “The Trilateral 
Dilemma in Financial Regulation,” in Anna Maria Lusardi, 
ed. (2008), Improving the Effectiveness of Financial Educa-
tion and Savings Programs.
 10  See, e.g., Council of Economic Advisors (February 2015), 
The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement 
Savings, available at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/blog/2015/02/23/effects-conflicted-investment-
advice-retirement-savings.
 11  Sendhil Mullainathan et al. (2012), “The Market for Fi-
nancial Advice: An Audit Study,” NBER, Working Paper No. 
17929 (noting that financial advisors tend not to de-bias 
their clients and instead often reinforce biases that are in 
their interests).
 12  Robert H. Mundheim (1965), “Professional Responsibilities 
of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,” Duke. L. J. 
445, 44X (noting that the suitability standard developed 
because educational, credentialing, and disclosure require-
ments were not adequate by themselves).
 13  Passive investing refers to investing in funds that attempt 
simply to match the performance of the class of securities 
to which the fund is indexed. Robo advisors typically em-
ploy algorithms to match consumers to a mix of exchange 
traded (index) funds based on the consumers’ age, risk 
tolerance, and time horizon, among other factors. Rebal-
ancing is the process of periodically adjusting the mix of 
investments so that differences in the relative performance 
of the investments do not lead the investor’s portfolio to 
shift away from the preferred mix.
 14  Alex Padalka, “Vanguard and Schwab Hybrids Trump Pure 
Robos in Assets,” Financial Advisor IQ, March 29, 2012.
 15  For example, our research and that of our collaborator 
Eric Johnson demonstrate how simple choice architecture 
NOTES 
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to automate. The fact that so many 
people who call themselves financial 
advisors focus on selling financial 
products that generate commissions 
and fees, rather than on planning and 
coaching, helps explain why regula-
tors have focused on the incentives 
that can distort the matching function 
of financial advisors. Yet these other 
services can be more important than 
matching customers to products. For 
this reason, the robo advisors with the 
largest and fastest growing market 
shares sell their services through or to 
human financial advisors.14 As robo 
advisors gradually replace the product 
matching function and other functions 
that are easily automated, it is possible 
that in the retail consumer market, 
financial advisors will largely replace 
stock brokers and will compete based 
on their ability to plan and coach. 
Our sense is that the product 
matching function is a bigger part of 
what insurance and mortgage brokers 
do, so it seems more likely to us that 
they will be more completely replaced 
by automated services. If not, however, 
that will be because they also provide 
additional, harder to automate services. 
NEW REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES 
Although robo advisors can be 
designed to ignore the misaligned 
incentives that have historically 
affected financial product intermedi-
aries, most robo advisors are devel-
oped or purchased by these traditional 
intermediaries. It would therefore be 
naïve to simply assume that interme-
diaries will always choose the algo-
rithms and choice architecture that are 
best for consumers, rather than those 
that are best for the intermediaries.15
Because there is so little research 
and analysis available to guide the 
regulation of robo advisors today and 
because the need for and correspond-
ing returns to regulatory oversight will 
increase as the scale of robo advice 
increases, we propose a regulatory 
trajectory that starts by building the 
necessary human capital. (The 2016 
FINRA report cited in footnote 2 
indicates that FINRA has begun to do 
this, but they may benefit significantly 
from collaborating with their coun-
terparts in the banking and insurance 
sectors.) Only then will regulators be 
able to develop a strategy that adapts 
to the scale and consequences of robo 
advice in the market in a manner that 
promotes both effective innovation, on 
the one hand, and honest and compe-
tent robo advisors in the market, on 
the other.
Regulators can start developing 
the necessary capacities now, when the 
stakes are smaller, and when consum-
ers are still sufficiently uncertain about 
robo advisors.16 Some firms may 
actually welcome the legitimation that 
could accompany independent certifi-
cation of the quality of robo advice. At 
least some powerful actors in the finan-
cial services sector likely will decide to 
support such regulatory initiatives, if 
only to be in a position to shape those 
initiatives, as we think BlackRock—the 
largest asset management company in 
the world—has already signaled that it 
is prepared to do.17 
We have identified four core com-
ponents of robo advisors that require 
distinct capacities to assess: (1) the 
ranking or matching algorithms and 
related processes, (2) the customer 
and financial product data to which 
the algorithms or other matching 
processes are applied, (3) the choice 
architecture through which the advice 
is delivered, and (4) the information 
technology infrastructure. 
1. RANKING OR MATCHING 
ALGORITHMS 
For robo advisors, the key algorithms 
techniques can be used to mislead consumers, especially 
when combined with a biased or inaccurate ranking algo-
rithm. 
 16  The regulators in the three key areas of financial ser-
vices—for example, NAIC (insurance), FINRA and SEC (se-
curities), and CFPB (banking)—may find it highly beneficial 
to work together to achieve this level of expertise.
 17  BlackRock (September 2016), Digital Investment Advice: 
Robo Advisors Come of Age, available at: http://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/en-lm/literature/whitepaper/
viewpoint-digital-investment-advice-september- 2016.pdf.
 18  Third parties may not maintain the information in a format 
that is accessible or they may not be willing to provide the 
information, whether because of concerns about fraud, 
legal constraints on providing the data, or other reasons.
 19  Hauser, John R., Glen L. Urban, Guilherme Liberali, and 
Michael Braun (2009), “Website Morphing,” Marketing Sci-
ence, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 202-223.
 20  See, e.g., several October 2016 New York Times stories 
about annuities in teacher pension plans.
NOTES 
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are those that rank the financial prod-
ucts for eventual selection by consum-
ers or, if the robo advisor makes the 
selection, matches consumers with 
products. For example, an investment 
robo advisor might be programmed to 
recommend that the mix of bond and 
stock funds in a consumer’s retirement 
savings portfolio gradually shift over 
time so that the portfolio becomes 
more heavily weighted with bond 
funds as the consumer ages. 
To assess the competence of these 
algorithms, some of the information 
that regulators could require from the 
robo advisors include: explanations of 
their models, the underlying data, and 
the propriety of that data; explana-
tions of the intended outcomes; and 
evidence that the algorithms in fact 
perform as designed (e.g., by requiring 
the robo advisor to respond to difficult 
test cases), among other things.
Regulators then will need to 
exercise good judgment based on this 
evidence, informed by domain-specific 
expertise. They will require demon-
strations that the algorithms do not 
consider—directly or indirectly—fac-
tors that would bias the outcomes in 
a way that is harmful for consumers. 
For example, it would be improper 
for a matching algorithm to consider 
either the size of the commission paid 
to the financial product intermedi-
ary or a proxy for that commission. 
The capability to test the competence 
and honesty of robo advisors rep-
resents a significant improvement 
over a human-based system, as it has 
been notoriously difficult to police 
the practice of steering clients and 
customers to the products that provide 
the best benefits to the intermediaries, 
not to the customers. 
2. CUSTOMER AND PRODUCT DATA
Robo advisors’ only source of financial 
product data is from product suppliers 
(or their agents), and there are valid 
business reasons why suppliers may 
be reluctant to provide data, absent 
robust legal reporting requirements. 
The easy access to comprehensive, 
public securities data may be the chief 
reason that investment robo advisors 
are more developed than other types 
of robo advisors.
Customer data, on the other hand, 
can of course be collected directly 
from customers as part of providing 
the robo advice to consumers. But that 
can be burdensome for the custom-
ers, and they may not in fact possess, 
or have easy access to, the data that 
the robo advisor needs (e.g., detailed 
asset/investment records for invest-
ment robo advisors and claim records 
for insurance robo advisors). The more 
efficient and accurate approach in 
many cases would be to collect con-
sumer data from third parties, but this 
approach has its own limitations.18 
With regard to data access, regula-
tors should be asking three kinds of 
questions. 
1. Has the robo advisor obtained 
access to reasonable sources of data, 
and are there any concerns that an 
inability to obtain data, particularly 
regarding products, will bias the 
rankings and matching in a way that 
disadvantages consumers in relation 
to intermediaries and sellers? 
2. Where there are gaps in data, what 
are the strategies that the robo advi-
sor considered to address those gaps, 
why did the robo advisor choose the 
strategies that it employed, and were 
those choices reasonable? 
3. Does the regulator have the author-
ity, whether formal or informal, to 
increase access to data and thereby 
improve the quality of the robo 
advice? 
Even assuming the data are 
available, there will be significant 
problems regarding the completeness 
and accuracy of the data (i.e., qual-
ity), particularly in the early stages 
of the development of robo advisors. 
Regulators will need to develop the 
capacity to ask hard, domain-specific 
questions about data quality and to 
evaluate the responses. 
3. CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
Behavioral science research dem-
onstrates the very large effects that 
choice architecture—the organization 
of the context in which people make 
decisions—can have on decisions. For 
example, the order in which options 
are presented, the number of options 
that are presented, the attributes of 
the options that are presented (and in 
which order), the framing of options 
(e.g., gain versus loss), all have major 
impacts. This means the way that 
robo advice is presented can have a 
profound effect on whether and how 
consumers use that advice.
The most important best practice 
in this arena is to employ rigorous 
experimental testing. That testing 
provides a record that could be made 
available for regulators to review in 
order to assess whether the robo advi-
sors have engaged in a meaningful and 
empirically informed choice architec-
ture effort. Experimental testing (and 
verification that the testing occurred) 
is easiest to do when the choice envi-
ronment is fully automated.19 Testing 
and verification is a more difficult 
exercise the context of hybrid robo 
6publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
advisors, in which customers interact 
with a person who operates the robo 
advisor behind the scenes, and in the 
many insurance contexts in which 
customers do some of their shopping 
online but then talk to a human insur-
ance agent who closes the sale. 
4. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE
Assessing the security and stability of 
information technology architecture 
is an increasingly important aspect 
of financial services regulation that 
extends well beyond robo advisors. 
Financial services regulators already 
appear to recognize the need to 
enhance their capacities in this area. 
Accordingly, we will not address this 
topic further, other than to offer two 
related observations. First, IT infra-
structure requirements that are too 
demanding could serve as barriers to 
entry for innovative new enterprises. 
Second, regulators could address this 
concern by developing a strategy for 
new market entrants that increases the 
level of scrutiny along with the scale 
of the enterprise, and they might con-
sider forgoing such scrutiny altogether 
for early stage robo advisors, and those 
with small market share, that only sell 
their services to businesses that have 
significant incentive to ensure that the 
IT infrastructure will be adequate. 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Both robo advisor technology and the 
regulatory environment have a long 
way to go before robo advisors begin to 
reach their potential of delivering high 
quality advice to a mass consumer mar-
ket across the broad range of financial 
services. But if we assume basic com-
petence and honesty for the moment, 
we can look ahead to other regulatory 
challenges and opportunities. 
Automation presents two great 
opportunities for regulators, namely 
(1) a leap forward in the ability 
to hold consumer financial prod-
uct intermediaries accountable for 
providing misleading, incomplete or 
otherwise inadequate advice and (2) a 
new approach to consumer financial 
product regulation that supports more 
diversity in the forms and features of 
consumer financial products to better 
match the heterogeneity of consumers. 
Consumer product intermediaries 
have long used complexity and choice 
to take advantage of consumers, par-
ticularly those who are less sophisti-
cated.20 In response, consumer protec-
tion advocates have called for a return 
to “plain vanilla” financial products. 
This is not because they believe that 
vanilla is best for everyone, but rather 
because the evidence shows that 
choice and complexity lead to exploi-
tation and regressive cross subsidies. 
Once consumers have easy access to 
robo advisors (and use them), however, 
that analysis could change. A good 
robo advisor—one that has access 
to the data necessary for adequate 
innovation—gives an unsophisticated 
consumer more processing power than 
even the most sophisticated consumer 
working on her own. That could lead 
to a fundamental shift in regulatory 
strategy: from regulating the content 
of consumer financial products to (a) 
facilitating access to the data that robo 
advisors need and to (b) taking appro-
priate measures to verify the quality of 
the robo advisors and the public access 
to them. 
The main challenge is fostering a 
market in which an evolving diver-
sity of robo advisors and consumer 
financial product intermediaries 
compete based on the measurable 
quality of their advice and related 
services for consumers. As regulators 
develop preferences about robo advi-
sor design, and as regulated entities 
come to understand those preferences, 
oversight may lead to a convergence 
of models, increasing the risk of 
catastrophic failure. This risk may be 
further exacerbated by new fiduciary 
rules. As the U.S. moves closer to a 
uniform fiduciary standard for human 
advisors, it is possible, perhaps likely, 
that this will greatly accelerate the 
use of automated investment advice, 
as human advisors tether themselves 
to the safe harbor of the largest robo 
advisor algorithms. 
CONCLUSION
Regulators should take a more 
active role in assessing robo advi-
sors, increasingly so as they grow in 
scale. As the demand for robo advice 
increases, protecting the integrity of 
financial markets will require the kind 
of cross disciplinary cooperation that 
regularly occurs in the domains of 
health and environmental regulation. 
The lawyers, economists, and behav-
ioral scientists already involved in 
financial services regulation will need 
to understand enough about computer 
and data science to craft and apply 
new regulatory strategies, and the 
computer and data scientists at the 
forefront of robo advisor innovation 
will need to understand enough about 
legal structures and ways of think-
ing to help make the new regulatory 
strategies sensible.
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